

**STATEMENT OF BUSHROD HOWARD, JR., ADVISER
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF YEMEN,
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE SENATE, ON JUNE 21, 1963.**

My name is Bushrod Howard and I am appearing on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen.

The Yemen is the victim of a brutal and vicious war of aggression. The arms and technicians are Russian, the soldiers are Egyptian, but the money that finances this aggression is American. American dollars support Nasser's aggression.

To give Nasser \$250, 000, 000 in American economic aid each year permits him to divert his other resources to wage his war in the Yemen, to pay for campaigns of subversion throughout the Arab world, and to prepare weapons for the extermination of Israel.

Thomas J. Hamilton, the N. Y. Times UN correspondent, recently wrote that "...In the circumstances, it is remarkable that neither the United Nations nor the United States has issued a single word of criticism of the United Arab Republic's violation of Charter provisions ruling out the use of force."

The answer is that there are those within the Government that, for various motives, are determined to appease Nasser at all costs. Some are putting all blame for the problems of the Middle East on Israel and American Jews. To counter these evils, they have, over the years, put some \$4 million of government funds into an anti-Israeli organization. Others fear that, if they do not give Nasser the support that he requires of us, he will become dependent on the Soviet Union. To offer the Yemen to Nasser seems as practical and useful as did the sacrifice of Ethiopia to Mussolini to Hoare and Laval. Finally, there are those who believe Nasser, if thwarted, can destroy all American interests overnight. They refuse to recognize that he is doing his best to do so every day.

Let me review the years in the Yemen since last September.

On September 26, 1963, there was an army coup in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. The Cabinet and many prominent citizens were killed or imprisoned. The Imam escaped.

Within three days, Egyptian troops and planes were in the Yemen to maintain the Rebels in power. There is no question that, since this time, the Rebels have only been able to survive due to the Egyptian intervention.

By the end of October, the pattern of the war was established. The Rebels and Egyptians controlled the plains and the main towns. The Loyalists the mountains.

In December, Nasser had about 12,000 troops in the Yemen. Despite the open Egyptian aggression and intervention, despite the clear support for and control of more than one third of the country by the Loyalist Government, despite the unwillingness of the population in the area controlled by the Egyptians to fight for the Rebels, the United States on December 19th recognized the Rebel regime and helped them obtain Yemen's UN seat.

U.S. APPROVES AGGRESSION

This is a most dangerous precedent. The United States has actively supported a doctrine against which we have fought since the end of World War II:

A revolution immediately followed by the intervention of a foreign army to maintain the Rebels in power. While the former government is still resisting effectively and maintains control to a very substantial area of the country, the Rebels are recognized on the grounds that the other government is reactionary and it is progressive.

The recognition of the Sallal regime by the United States has not been explained. It was said that Nasser had agreed to withdraw his troops from the Yemen, then estimated at 12,000, in return for recognition of his puppet regime.

But by mid-February, Nasser had 30,000 troops in the Yemen. In that month, he was able to mount a successful attack on the al-Jauf plain between Sana'a and Sa'ada. As a result he was able to "occupy" the Eastern Desert.

BUNKER-BUNCHE MISSIONS

On March 1, 1963, the time of the Bunche visit to Yemen, Nasser announced that the war was over and resistance had collapsed. Ambassador Elsworth Bunker's mission was considered by the State Department to be a face-saving way for Crown Prince Faisal to "disengage" himself from a lost cause. All other observers felt that withdrawal of the Egyptians would lead to the

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immediate collapse of the Rebels. In fact by March 11, the Loyalists were already counterattacking in the al-Jauf plain. By the first week of April, they had reestablished contact with Southern front. By May 28, all the al-Jauf plain had been recaptured and Loyalist forces had reached the Sana'a-Hodeida road.

Reports both from the Yemen and from American reporters indicate that the Royalists have made very substantial military progress since the middle of March and there is no question that they can win as soon as the Egyptians withdraw.

Egyptian strategy is plain: terror bombing. Last week in addition to napalm bombs, high explosive and strafing, there are two reported raids with the use of poison gas. This has been the pattern of the Egyptian aggression, when defeated on the ground, they have resorted to increased air raids.

THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 8, 1963

On April 8, 1963, the representatives of the UAR and of Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to cease their intervention in the Yemen civil war and to accept the supervision of this disengagement by the United Nations. The UAR agreed to stop all fighting within the Yemen and to withdraw its troops and planes. Saudi Arabia agreed to stop supplying arms and bases to the Loyalists and to establish a 12-1/2 kilometer demilitarized zone on either side of the Saudi Arabian-Yemen border.

Saudi Arabia immediately put its side of the Agreement into force. Nasser not only stalled, giving the excuse that the UN observers were not in place, but publicly repudiated the Agreement in a speech at Cairo. On May 22, he proclaimed to his Army,

"You were the vanguard of those forces on the battlefield, and you have finally returned with a victory. They (Egyptian troops) are on the Yemeni battlefield at this moment. They will be there until it becomes certain - without any deception or doubt - that the reaction that hates the Yemen revolution is forced through defeat to contain that hatred in its own heart."

A few days later, Nasser's General commanding in the Yemen was more specific. He stated that the Egyptian army would remain for five years if this

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was necessary to defeat the Royalists.

On Sunday June 2, 1963, Thomas J. Hamilton, the head of the N.Y. Times UN bureau, wrote a "New Test for U.N.," which states the case admirably:

"... The General Assembly has been so preoccupied... that the most important international issue now confronting the organization, the United Arab Republic's intervention in the civil war in the Yemen, has attracted little attention.

"The immediate question is whether - and how soon - Secretary U Thant will go ahead with his plan to send 200 observers to Yemen. They would have the dual purpose of checking up on Saudi Arabia's promise to stop supplying military equipment to the forces of the Iman and to verify President Gamal Abdel Nasser's compliance with his promise to withdraw the 28,000 troops he sent to Yemen to support the republican regime.

"... In the circumstances, it is remarkable that neither the United Nations nor the United States has issued a single word of criticism of the United Arab Republic's violation of the Charter provisions ruling out the use of force.

"The danger of a Middle Eastern war will remain unless Colonel Nasser decides to suspend his aggressive designs regarding both the Yemen and Saudi Arabia... Actually the question whether the United Nations observers are sent to the Yemen is not of great importance as far as the immediate issue is concerned.

"As in the case of the United Nations Middle East force, which was stationed in Egypt in 1956 after the Suez crisis, the observers would merely constitute the outward and visible signs of a cease-and-desist agreement. Their presence would save face for Nasser, in the event that he decides to stay his hand. But the withdrawal agreement could be carried through without them."

Shockingly, the lower policy level of the State Department have actively and consciously sabotaged the UN Agreement. They have stated that it would be "unrealistic" to expect Nasser to withdraw his troops from the Yemen until he was sure that Sallal could survive unaided.

These statements have constantly been made since the April Agreement by officials in the Department of State. This is known to Nasser, and this is the reason that he feels that he can defy and deny his agreement to withdraw. He believes that NOTHING that he does will stop the United States from continuing to support him financially and politically.

The pattern of constantly trying to outbid the Soviet Union in the contest for Nasser's goodwill has been too well established for mere admonitions publicly expressed (and privately denied) to have any effect.

The only way that Nasser can be forced to abide by his Agreement to withdraw from the Yemen is to put in a self enforcing sanction should he not abide by his word.

I therefore recommend that the Foreign Assistance Act be amended by adding the following paragraph to Section 620:

"(g) No assistance shall be provided to the United Arab Republic under this Act, or under the Agricultural Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, after October 1, 1963, unless the President determines that the United Arab Republic has complied with the Agreement entered into by the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia and the Secretary General of the United Nations on April 8, 1963."

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This would seem a mild and reasonable provision. Nasser has committed a clear act of aggression. He has promised twice to withdraw his troops from Yemen. He has now stated that he has no intention of abiding by his latest agreement. It is surely not contrary to good sense and good policy for the Congress to declare that Nasser shall have no further American aid to finance a war that he has promised to stop and that we believe to be wrong and dangerous.

CONSEQUENCES OF THREAT TO CUT AID TO NASSER

Nasser now obtains all the arms and military experts he needs from the Soviet Union. If American aid is withdrawn, Nasser will turn to and become totally dependent on the Soviet Union is the thesis of the Department of State.

This is not a threat. Even assuming Nasser could obtain aid from the Soviet Union to replace our aid, this would destroy his appeal to other Arabs. Nasser's present strength is his apparent ability to obtain aid from both the U.S. and the USSR regardless of his irresponsible and aggressive behavior.

Minorities throughout the Middle East - Kurds, Shia Muslims and Christians - fear a Nasser state. They are well aware of the treatment of the minorities in Egypt. Small businessmen and entrepreneurs are equally afraid of Nasser's socialism. All believe that there is no hope of resisting Nasser if he continues to obtain the support of the United States unless they obtain the support of the Soviet Union.

Today, in Iraq, for the first time, there is a real chance of a Russian breakthrough. The Kurds are facing a genocidal campaign by the present Government. The Shia Muslims who are the majority in Southern Iraq and in Baghdad are resentful of the discrimination by both the Nasserists and the Baathists who stand for a unitary Sunni Arab State. Both the Kurds and the Shias are well penetrated by the Communists. It is a matter of time when the military power of the Kurds will be allied to the political power of the Shias to bring about a Russian oriented revolution.

THE YEMEN, THE US AND THE UN

Throughout the Middle East, and in many other parts of the world, the UN sponsored disengagement of the Yemen is being watched. The United States Government has intervened by pressure on Saudi Arabia, Britain and Jordan; by the Bunker Mission; and, by encouraging the UN to undertake the responsibility.

Should the UN fail to make Nasser withdraw according to his pledge, it will be as great a blow as the betrayal of Ethiopia by the League of Nations.

Yet, today any reporter will tell you - (1) the State Department are convinced that Nasser will not withdraw until he is sure that Sallal can survive, and (2) Sallal cannot survive if Nasser withdraws.

The amendment that I suggest would in Secretary Dulles' phrase make the UN agreement self-enforcing.

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To betray the Yemen by permitting Nasser to ^{flout} the agreement to withdraw will be to serve notice that the United Nations is not a peace making force but a cloak for cynical appeasement. ILLEGIB

The Administration is making a dangerous and reckless maintain that they have a moderating influence on Nasser due to American economic aid. (They refuse to use this moderating influence, on the ground that to use it would be to lose it, but that is another question.)

Yet it is clear that there is a present and real danger that Nasser will take over Saudi Arabia with its \$500 million a year oil revenues. When that occurs, Nasser will no longer need American economic aid. The famed moderating influence will disappear unused.

To base American policy on the continued existence of the present government of Saudi Arabia is far more irresponsible and dangerous than to enforce the UN agreement or to tell Nasser that if he does not abide by his UN agreement to leave Yemen, he will get no further aid from the United States.

Finally, there is a very real moral question. I am ashamed and angry to have witnessed the criminally vicious war that American money has financed. Those in the Administration and in the Congress who advocate or vote money to this vicious racist for his aggressions must accept their responsibility for his actions. The financier of the criminal bears some responsibility for the crimes. To vote Nasser vast sums of money, without any guarantee that he will cease his aggression, means that many innocent people will die as a direct result of that vote. Today in Yemen, tomorrow elsewhere.

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(Bushrod Howard is registered as a foreign agent of the Kingdom of Yemen with the Department of Justice. Registration Number 1621.)